Update from Kevin Miller

Greetings Friends,

I want to first note that uploading pictures from FOB Fiaz takes much longer than it did in JBAD, so it might take me longer to post new pictures. The good news is I have some pictures previously uploaded and have been able to upload some of my Konar pictures so should be able to send out photo album links soon. I can tell you I have taken a lot of pictures since arriving in Kunar and definitely want to share them.

There are a lot of topics about which I want to share so now it’s just a matter of finding the time to get them down and send them out. The good news is that being busy is truly making the time go fast for me. It’s hard for me to believe I’ve been in Kunar for a month already.

The first thing about which I want to share is something one of our Security Force (SECFOR) soldiers went through right after I moved to Konar – SPC Powezka was awarded his U.S. Citizenship. His family emigrated to the U.S. from Poland when he was 16. He joined the Army, which allowed him to get his citizenship faster than normal. The day I got picked up from JBAD he was dropped off at Jalalabad Air Field (JAF) to fly to Bagram Air Field (BAF). There, he took his citizenship test – which he passed – and then took part in a swearing in ceremony. Unfortunately, we were unable to have anyone there for the ceremony, but it’s pretty cool that it took place and apparently they made a pretty big deal about it there. SPC Powezka thought it was funny that, when he got there, people said he must be in the wrong place because he doesn’t look or sound like an immigrant. He’s fair skinned and has an almost Bronx accent. I haven’t had a chance to talk to him much to learn more about his situation and history. Hopefully I will before he leaves Afghanistan.

Another thing I wanted to discuss is the attitudes of different soldiers – and, to some degree, soldiers in different roles – toward the Afghan people. Those of us who went through mentor training at Fort Riley spent a great deal of time learning about the culture of Afghanistan, some of its history, and the fundamentals of Counterinsurgency (commonly referred to as COIN). Many of the people deployed here in other roles did not, apparently, get the same level of this training. And, to some degree, the nature of the soldiers who find themselves in different roles may influence their attitudes. So, to understand things better, let me start with an explanation of COIN.

In a nutshell, the concept of COIN is to create an environment in which an insurgency cannot take root. The term that is regularly used – and that I may have used in a previous update – is “winning the hearts and minds of the people.” It’s not hard to understand, but it can be very hard to accomplish in a manner that is sustainable. The idea is that, if a sufficient portion of a country’s population supports the government – that is, truly believes in the government and its ability to effectively secure and run the country – then the government will remain stable and insurgents who wish to topple the government will be unsuccessful.

Now, a “sufficient portion of a country’s population” doesn’t necessarily mean a majority or some set percentage. Rather, it is a population set that results in the “center of gravity” of the country falling toward the side of supporting the government. This might require a majority, but it can be a smaller group if there is a large portion of the population that is neutral or unaffected by what happens in the government and/or by insurgents. The challenge, then, is to gain fairly strong support of enough people to bring the center of gravity towards the government.

Unfortunately, there are several important factors to winning the support of the people, and Afghanistan is in dire straits on some of these. In order to lend support to the government, people need to feel that their basic needs are either being met or that the government is in the best position to eventually meet those needs. If neither of these is happening, the population becomes vulnerable to anti-government forces. The basic needs to be met include security (feeling that people are safe from harm and criminal activity), shelter, food, and clothing.

Most people prefer that they earn all of these except the security – they really aren’t looking for handouts. But in order to earn these things, there have to be jobs; in order for there to be jobs, there needs to be an infrastructure; in order for there to be an infrastructure, the government needs to have resources; and in order for the government to have resources, they must either have natural resources to exploit or they must collect some form of tax.

In the case of Afghanistan, they are getting their initial resources to begin this process from the international community in the form of financial aid and various types of assistance. However, the extent of infrastructure needing to be created is immense. And while that infrastructure is being built, the basic needs of the population must still be met. Recent droughts have made this an even bigger challenge than it might otherwise have been – as has a world-wide shortage of many food staples such as rice, corn, and wheat. Consequently, international aid is stretched thin.

Of course, while the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community strive to meet the basic needs of the people, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF – the military from throughout the world) and the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF – the Afghan Army and Police) try to provide security. Actually, ISAF works to provide security and works to train the ANSF, but here again, the ISAF resources are stretched thin. In the meantime, those people and organizations who would like to return Afghanistan to the oppressive atmosphere that existed under the Taliban are trying to undermine the security and the government.

Now, the people whom ISAF and ANSF are trying to protect and whom the government is trying to serve must decide – at least to some degree – where their loyalties lie. Their past experiences will, of course, influence these loyalties. Thus, invasions by the Soviet Union – and decades ago by the British – and the oppressive government of the Taliban make them wary of any government and its ability to truly care for the people. Coupled with anti-American propaganda and periodic successful attacks by anti-government forces, it’s understandable why the loyalties of the people are hard to win.

Of course, there have been mistakes in the battle for hearts and minds. I won’t go into most here; that can be left to the political pundits and analysts. I will, however, touch on one of the biggest challenges from a military standpoint. The anti-government forces primary tool is violence. They regularly attack the ANA, the ANP, and coalition forces. Consequently, these forces respond militarily. The anti-government forces also operate in such a way that they try to cause harm to civilians and their villages that they can then blame on the coalition forces.

That’s where COIN creates a rub. To build support from the people, we need to avoid collateral damage; but often, to catch or kill the perpetrators – those who are attacking the ANA, ANP, and ISAF – requires fighting in villages and periodically destroying buildings, including homes. And, most unfortunately, civilians are sometimes killed as well. Here again, I’m not going to discuss this specific issue as it is much too touchy for this forum, but I will use it to further explain COIN.

With a traditional military mindset, when forces come under attack, they fight back as hard as possible to capture or kill the enemy. If the enemy hides in a village or specific building and continues to fight, you bring whatever firepower you have available to bear on the enemy’s location until he is destroyed or surrenders. Given the U.S. focus on avoiding collateral damage and civilian deaths, we would bring to bear as much firepower as possible that would cause the least damage and injury other than to the enemy.

The full COIN approach would go much farther toward protecting people and property. Once the enemy is holed up somewhere, even if he continues to fight, we would consider the longer term – or second and third order – effects. It works sort of like this: If we kill the enemy (let’s say two guys with machine guns and RPG’s) by having a bomb dropped on the house to which they have fled and from which they are now shooting, we will have kept two enemy fighters from ever attacking us again. At the same time, we will have destroyed someone’s home – and maybe killed civilians who were in the home – and everyone in that village will know it. While they may realize that the destruction was justified, they may also harbor resentment toward the coalition and/or Afghan forces involved.

On the other hand, given the same scenario, if the coalition forces hold their fire – or at least don’t bring in the heavy weapons thus avoiding the destruction of any buildings – they may allow two enemy fighters to escape. But the people in the village will likely be glad that the coalition and Afghan forces showed restraint. Immediately following this engagement, a meeting can be held with the local elders explaining why the heavy weapons were not used but also asking the village to help in the future by either keeping the enemy out or reporting their presence.

Of course, the situations are never this straight forward, but it does illustrate the COIN concept in theory. In the first approach, people in the village might end up supporting the enemy and some might even assist or join them; so while two enemy fighters are killed, the enemy becomes stronger. In the second approach, people in the village may turn in the enemy or weapons caches, report enemy activities such as planting of bombs, or even decide to join the police or army; so while the two enemy fighters may escape, their enemy’s overall position becomes weaker while the government’s becomes stronger.

There is a lot more to COIN such as rebuilding the infrastructure in order to build the economy, improving education and health care, and similar activities. One of these is simply showing respect for the country and people of Afghanistan. That’s another challenge and the one from which this discussion began. The soldiers who are deploying to Afghanistan – as well as to Iraq – are extremely diverse, but one thing many have in common is a more aggressive nature; such a nature can help make a good traditional soldier. In a COIN conflict, however, the aggressiveness may need to be tempered.

Many soldiers understand this, but others don’t and it can be reflected in their attitudes toward the country and the people. I have heard soldiers make disparaging remarks about Afghans, Muslims, and the country and culture in general. I believe this is, in part, because they were not taught about the history, culture, and religion of Afghanistan. Therefore, they allow prejudices to shine through – prejudices based on misinformation and negative perceptions seen in the news or even from personal experience but experiences that were limited and/or isolated. They apply these limited experiences to the entire country and population. While many in the military hierarchy recognize this, it takes a long time to transform the mindset of an entire military.

Fortunately, those soldiers who are regularly interacting with the Afghans, or even likely to encounter them in person, are typically the ones who have received the cultural training as well as the COIN training. And, of course, it is up to the leaders at all levels to work on educating their subordinates and improving their perceptions of the Afghans.

This discussion brings to mind an observation I made a year or so ago. Some parents and/or organizations in Madison, WI were complaining about the presence of military recruiters at the high schools – and similar complaints have been made regarding their presence on college campuses. There were also complaints about military advertising in the schools such as on scoreboards and of some Marines who came to one high school and worked with some gym classes.

The argument they seem to make is that the military is preying on youth who are vulnerable. It appears they want to ensure that learning about career opportunities in the military are limited to those who seek out the information – in other words, the “military” types. These people seem to approve of the military as a good option for only certain kids – not most kids. Of course, this approach would help ensure that the military does not reflect the diversity of our country and communities. Rather, it would perpetuate the military of the past and present. So, as the nature of the military needs to change in order to adapt to changing conflicts and roles, it would be more difficult because the nature of the enlistees does not similarly change.

Personally, I think I’m an anomaly in the military because I joined to help pay for college and have never thought of myself as an aggressive, typical military type. In basic training – which was focused on a traditional military mindset – I wondered what I was doing there; I wasn’t a fighter and killer. Once in, I realized there was a great deal more to the military and that there were significant rewards; I discovered that I could really make a positive difference through the military while applying an entirely different skill set than that traditionally associated with the military. So, while the military needs good, tough, aggressive enlistees, it just as badly needs enlistees who are thoughtful, philosophical, empathetic, creative, intellectual, and so much more. Interestingly, the military’s most elite soldiers typically fit this second mold as much as if not more than the first.

In addition, as the role of the military changes – such as the role we are playing in Iraq and Afghanistan – it will need more people of this latter nature. In fact, serving as mentors – or advisors – was traditionally a Special Forces assignment. Because of the scope of mentoring needed, this assignment is now being given to other soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines who receive the necessary training. So in my mind, parents, teachers, counselors, and others who influence young people’s career choices need to consider not just the fact that a broader range of kids would benefit from a military career – or even just a shorter stint in the military – but they should also consider how much the military would benefit from in influx of diversity. Of course, I’m not talking about ethnic diversity, but rather a diversity of philosophies, beliefs, natures, backgrounds, etc. And the military benefit would then benefit our country as these young men and women moved through the ranks and into positions of influence in other arenas.

I realize I have gone from providing an update to preaching from a soap box, but I think these are important issues for people to consider. Since I have gone on at length, I’ll wrap this up so it can be sent out. I will, however, add this thought as a precursor to the next photo album link I will send out. Afghanistan has, without any doubt in my mind, the potential to become completely self-sufficient. The country does have resources – though the infrastructure is not yet in place to take advantage of those resources. It also has people of incredible character with a desire to be a truly free and democratic country – albeit an Islamic democracy. The youth are being educated, and they hold the key to the future.

My next photo album contains pictures of literally hundreds of Afghan children. You will be amazed at the number who smile, wave, and give us thumbs up. Somewhere they have gained a liking for our presence. I know part of this is because we have given them treats, school supplies, and other things. But I also know they have not received anything substantial directly from us in the military. That means the adults – their parents and other relatives – are at least not bad mouthing us and are possibly even telling the kids that we are helping them toward a better future. I am truly thrilled to be a part of that – and I sincerely thank the many of you who have sent school supplies, winter clothes, blankets, and other items to give to these kids. Know that you are truly making a difference.

Kevin
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